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1Summary: This paper analyses strategic market allocation by two auc-
tioneers holding substitutes. It characterizes both the cooperative and com-
petitive outcomes. Under cooperation or competition with close substitutes,
bidders are allocated according to the expected total surplus each generates.
This market division is e¢ cient if and only if the distribution of bidders￿
tastes is not skewed. If skewed, reserve prices distort participation towards
the least preferred item. For greater degrees of product di⁄erentiation compe-
tition leads to multiple equilibria. Finally, competition with close substitutes
sellers leave participation rents to their weakest bidder. They do not in other
cases, whether they compete or cooperate.
21 Introduction
Auctions are an increasingly popular trading mechanism. While once re-
served to sell rare or exclusive items, they are now employed for the sale of
objects that have close substitutes. In Ireland second hand houses are sold
through English auctions and this year￿ s auction sales revenue is in excess
of 1.6 billion euros1. Car rental companies and governmental agencies in
the UK and in the United States auction their used cars. Finally auctions
are also used to allocate shares of companies going public. In each of these
cases, the number of bidders attending a particular auction and the revenue
it raises critically depends on what other items are available and on how
these are sold. This interdependence of auctions￿performances complicates
substantially the auction design problem sellers face. So far, the literature
considering competing auctioneers focused at the sale of homogeneous items.
This paper ￿lls a gap by considering the case of horizontally di⁄erentiated
items which is, I feel, more representative of some of the markets mentioned
above.
Only a small number of papers examine markets with competing auction-
eers. McAfee [5], Peters and Severinov [9] and Peters [8] address competing
auctioneers holding homogeneous items. These papers examine markets with
large numbers of sellers and buyers. The advantage of this assumption is that
it gently restricts the strategic interactions between the market participants
which permits to solve for the equilibrium. The drawback of this approach
is that it is not clear whether the results are applicable to markets with a
limited number of sellers.
A di⁄erent strand of literature considers optimal nonlinear pricing with pri-
vately informed agents and competing principals. Within this strand, Stole
[10] also considers horizontally di⁄erentiated products. Nonetheless, what
separates Stole [10] from an auction setting is the fact that in the environ-
ment he considers a buyer￿ s expected payo⁄does not depend on other buyers￿
decisions. In an auction setting, a bidder￿ s probability of winning a speci￿c
item and the price he pays for it depend on the actions of other bidders.
Thus, contrary to Stole [10], when an auctioneer alters one of his strategic
variables, it a⁄ects both: the payo⁄ bidders receive at his auction as well as
the reservation payo⁄ bidders can gather from attending any other auction.
1Figure obtained from selling agents "Douglas Newman Good" 2005 economic report.
3This greater interdependence between sales￿performances complicates sub-
stantially the problem.
In this paper we consider a market with 2 auctioneers. Thus, in contrast to
the literature cited above, strategic interactions between sellers will play a
more prominent role. The cost of this is that to make the problem tractable
we have to restrict attention to competition in reserve prices in English auc-
tions. In this sense, the paper is closest to Burguet and SÆkovics [3] who an-
alyze similar issues in a market for homogeneous items by restricting seller￿ s
strategies to setting reserve prices in second price auctions. It departs from
it as I introduce product di⁄erentiation.
The model considered is based on Hotelling￿ s [4] linear model. There
are n buyers, located between the 2 sellers. Each buyer privately observes
his location which gives a measure for his willingness to pay for each item.
Sellers announce simultaneously their reserve prices which constitutes the
lowest acceptable bid for their English auction. Given the reserve prices and
their valuation, the buyers decide on which auction to attend. We consider
that auctions are simultaneous so that one buyer can attend at most one
auction. We search for sub-game perfect equilibria in which sellers perfectly
anticipate the buyers￿behavior which is described in section 3.
Interestingly, both Stole [10] and this paper show that the monopolis-
tic outcome can still form an equilibrium provided the optimal monopolistic
market shares do not overlap. This potentially occurs for highly di⁄erentiated
items. For closer substitutes, the monopolistic outcome no longer forms an
equilibrium. We analyze the sellers￿pro￿t maximizing decisions in sections
4 and 5. In section 4, we assume sellers set their reserve prices cooperatively,
maximizing joint pro￿ts. We show that reserve prices are set so as to allo-
cate bidders on the basis of the expected marginal revenues each is associated
with. A necessary and su¢ cient condition for e¢ ciency is that the bidder
who values both objects equally must be equally likely to win either item.
When the distribution of bidders is skewed, reserve prices distort participa-
tion towards the least preferred item. Sellers set a higher reserve price for
the preferred item extracting more informational rents on its market while
the lower reserve price encourages participation for the least preferred item.
Finally, under cooperation sellers leave no rents to the weakest, marginal,
bidder.
In section 5 we consider competing sellers. We show that for close substi-
4tutes sellers leave some participation rents to the weakest, marginal bidder
as they set their reserve prices below his valuations. The indi⁄erent bidder
is the one generating the same expected total surplus no matter which seller
he attends. This surplus is the sum of marginal revenue and participation
rents. Finally the same necessary and su¢ cient condition holds for e¢ ciency.
Once again, reserve prices are such that participation is biased towards the
least preferred item if any.
For greater degrees of product di⁄erentiation, multiple equilibria arise. For
each of these, the weakest, indi⁄erent bidder gets no rents. These equilib-
ria re￿ ect the fact that for greater degrees of product di⁄erentiation sellers
refrain from infringing their opponent￿ s market share. Indeed, as products
become more di⁄erentiated the cost of attracting bidders located further
away increases while the bene￿t decreases. Indeed, while intrinsic marginal
valuations decrease with product di⁄erentiation, the relative value of the out-
side option increases. In such cases, sellers set high reserve prices so as to
save on participation rents.
Finally, this paper highlights the following two features. First, it shows entry
is more severely restricted when two auctions are held simultaneously instead
of sequentially. This is so because the presence of a substitute gives bidders
an outside option which increases the cost of participation. As bidders are
o⁄ered two items instead of one the marginal bene￿t from a lower reserve
price is weakened while the marginal cost is the same. Thus, reserve prices
are higher under simultaneous auctioning. Second, the paper formally com-
pares oligopoly pricing with the optimal reserve prices. Bulow and Roberts
[1] show that in a symmetric environment the optimal reserve price is equiv-
alent to the monopoly price when considering the demand associated with a
representative bidder. We prove and explain why this analogy does not ex-
tend to the oligopoly setting. Nonetheless their approach proved very useful
in shedding light on the results.
Section 6 presents a conclusion.
2 The model
Consider 2 sellers (seller 1 and seller 2) each possessing a single item. We
assume that sellers are risk neutral and that they have no interest in keeping
or obtaining either item. The sellers face a market composed of n risk neutral
consumers with n > 2. These consumers consider the items to be horizontally
5di⁄erentiated. Each consumer is characterized by his taste, ￿ 2 [0;1] (refer
to as a type), which gives a measure for his willingness to pay for each item.
A consumer with taste ￿ is willing to pay vi (￿) for seller i0s item (i = 1;2).
Let
v1 (￿) = 1 ￿ t￿;
v2 (￿) = 1 ￿ t(1 ￿ ￿);
where t 2 (0;1]. Graphically, this situation can be represented as Hotelling￿ s
[4] model of horizontal product di⁄erentiation with sellers located at the
extremities of a line of length 1.
Each buyer privately observes his own taste. However, it is common
knowledge that types are identically and independently distributed according
to a distribution function F(￿) de￿ned over [0;1]. We assume that F(:) is
continuously di⁄erentiable and let f (￿) denote the density function, with
f (￿) > 0 almost everywhere.
We make the following, particularly usual, regularity assumption regard-
ing the distribution of types:












are increasing2 and continuous.
Given this formalization, there are three e⁄ects from a reduction in t.
The ￿rst is to increase the value of each item to all buyers, the second is to
decrease the amount of private information and the last is to reduce product
di⁄erentiation. Implications from each of these e⁄ects, and the way they
interact are particularly interesting for the case of competing sellers.
We consider that the sellers simultaneously auction their items using an
English auction. The rule of this auction is such that sellers raise the bids
until a unique bidder remains active. Each seller￿ s strategic variable is his
reservation price which corresponds to the lowest acceptable bid. Throughout
the paper we will use the following notation:
Notation: Let ￿1 and ￿2 denote the reservation prices set by seller 1 and
seller 2 respectively. Let (r1;r2) 2 ]0;+1) ￿ (￿1;1[ be de￿ned such
that vi(ri) ￿ ￿i (i = 1;2). Finally let R = (r1;r2).
2Allowing for nondecreasing functions instead may lead to multiplicity of equilibria.
6Notice that for any (￿1;￿2) there exists a unique (r1;r2) such that vi(ri) ￿
￿i (i = 1;2). Thus, considering ￿i (i = 1;2) as seller i0s strategic variable is
equivalent to considering ri (i = 1;2) as seller i0s strategic variable.
The timing of the game is the following. First, Nature draws the buyers￿
tastes. Then, both sellers simultaneously announce their reservation prices.
Given this information buyers decide on which auction to attend. Not at-




Consider a buyer who attends one of the two auctions. If he is the only
one attending the auction, he wins and pays the reservation price. If there
is excess demand at the reservation price, a dominant strategy equilibrium
consists in dropping out whenever the price reaches his true valuation.
Expected rents from participating necessarily decrease with t. Indeed, the
price, which is equal to the second highest valuation, converges towards the
winner￿ s valuation as t decreases. This illustrates the fact that a bidder￿ s
private information decreases as t converges to zero.
Participation:
We consider that bidders can attend at most one auction and have a 0
utility is they attend none. When reservation prices are such that r1 ￿ r2
buyers with a valuation greater than the reserve price for auction 1 have a
valuation lower than the reserve price for auction 2 and vice-versa. In that
case, all bidders with type ￿ ￿ r1 attend seller 1 and all bidders such that
￿ ￿ r2 attend seller 2. Buyers such that ￿ 2 ]r1;r2[ do not participate. When
r1 > r2, all ￿ 2 [r2;r1] are such that their valuation for each item is greater
than its reserve price. In that case, we have the following result:
Lemma 1: If reservation prices are such that r1 > r2 there always exists
a threshold value ￿R 2 [0;1] such that the following strategy forms a
symmetric Nash equilibrium: all buyers with a valuation ￿ ￿ ￿R attend
seller 1, while all buyers with a valuation ￿ ￿ ￿R attend seller 2.
7The variable ￿R characterizes the indi⁄erent type. It is uniquely de￿ned by:
(1 ￿ F(￿R))
n￿1 (v1(￿R) ￿ ￿1) = F
n￿1(￿R)(v2(￿R) ￿ ￿2): (1)
We have ￿R 2 [0;1] for any (r1;r2) 2 ]0;+1)￿(￿1;1[ such that r1 > r2.
Proof: see Appendix 1.
The variable ￿R determines each seller￿ s market share. Equation (1) states
that the indi⁄erent type is the one for whom the expected surplus upon
getting item 1 equals the expected surplus upon getting item 2.
4 The sellers￿game
In this section, we analyze the strategic allocation of buyers for all possible
degrees of product di⁄erentiation. Particular attention is paid to e¢ cient
allocation as de￿ned below.
De￿nition: An allocation of buyers is e¢ cient if all ￿ < 1
2 attend seller 1,
while all ￿ > 1
2 attend seller 2.
In other words, bidders are e¢ ciently allocated as they bid for the object
they value the most.
Let the realization of types be ranked such that ￿1 < ￿2 < ::: < ￿n￿1 < ￿n.
The expected revenue to seller 1, when setting reserve price r1 while seller 2
sets r2 is given by








where x = r1 if r1 ￿ r2 and x = ￿R if r1 > r2.and where distribution of
(￿1;￿2) is given by
f1;2 (￿1;￿2) = n(n ￿ 1)(1 ￿ F (￿2))
n￿1 f (￿2)f (￿1):
Seller 1 gets the reserve price if he faces a single bidder and the second highest
bid if he faces at least 2 bidders. Similarly, seller 2 gets








8where x = r2 when r2 ￿ r1 and x = ￿R when r2 < r1.and where the
distribution of (￿n￿1;￿n) is
fn￿1;n (￿n￿1;￿n) = n(n ￿ 1)(F (￿n￿1))
n￿1 f (￿n￿1)f (￿n):




MR1 (￿1)nf (￿1)(1 ￿ F (￿1))
n￿1 d￿1 (2)
￿nF (x)(1 ￿ F (x))
n￿1 [v1(x) ￿ v1 (r1)]; (3)
where x = r1 if r1 ￿ r2 and x = ￿R if r1 > r2 and where MR(:) stands for
marginal revenue and is given by














n￿1 (x)(1 ￿ F (x))[v2 (x) ￿ v2(r2)]; (6)
where x = r2 when r2 ￿ r1 and x = ￿R when r2 < r1 and









As established in Myerson [6], a seller gets, on expectation, the valuation
of the winning bidder shaded by the informational rents minus the potential
surplus left to the marginal bidder.
The concept of marginal revenue is introduced in Bulow and Roberts
[1]. This paper links mechanism design to monopoly pricing and provides
an approach that is particularly helpful to understand the sellers￿strategic
decisions. An alternative approach to ￿nd these expressions consists in as-
suming that sellers for items 1 and 2 are independent monopolies. At a price
pi = vi (￿) (i = 1;2) the quantity sold to a representative buyer is q1 = F (￿)
units of item 1 and q2 = (1 ￿ F (￿)) units of item 2. Thus, we can express













￿1 (1 ￿ q2)
￿￿
:
Di⁄erentiating the above expressions with respect to qi (i = 1;2) leads to (4)
and (7).
Under the regularity assumption, the marginal revenues are decreasing










Under the regularity assumption b ￿ exists, it is unique and independent of t
and it solves:
1 ￿ 2b ￿ +
1 ￿ 2F(b ￿)
f(b ￿)
￿ 0: (8)
Whether MRi(b ￿;t) ￿ 0 (i = 1;2), depends on t. Let t > 0 be such that
MRi(b ￿;t) = 0 (i = 1;2). Whether t < 1 depends on the distribution function.
Under the uniform distribution t = 1. For any distribution function such that
the median (denoted ￿M) is 1=2 we have t < 1 only when the population is
polarized. Figure 1 below represents the marginal revenues in both cases:
t ￿ t and t > t.
Insert ￿gure 1 here.
As established in Bulow and Roberts [1] and given (2) and (5) it is optimal
for a monopolistic seller to set the reserve price so that only bidders associated
with a non-negative marginal revenue participate. Let ￿1 and (1￿￿2) denote
these optimal monopolistic market shares. They are the unique solution to
MRi(￿i;t) = 0 for i = 1;2.
Proposition 1: If the distribution function is such that t < 1, then for any
t > t, the optimal reserve prices are ￿1 = v1(￿1) and ￿2 = v2(￿2) whether
sellers compete or cooperate. The market shares do not overlap.
Proof: see Appendix 2.
If the distribution function is such that t < 1 then for su¢ ciently di⁄er-
entiated items sellers set the optimal monopolistic reserve prices and market
shares do not overlap. For any t < t the optimal monopolistic reserve prices
no longer form a solution as the monopolistic market shares would overlap.
Interestingly Stole [10] exhibits the same threshold condition to separate the
local monopoly outcome from the competition outcome for the particular
case of horizontal di⁄erentiation.
104.1 Cooperating sellers
Consider that the 2 sellers decide on their reserve prices cooperatively, max-
imizing joint pro￿t. Let ￿c
i refer to seller i￿ s cooperative reserve price.
Proposition 2: For any t ￿ t the optimal reserve prices for each object are
such that the market is entirely covered. The indi⁄erent type extracts
no rents and bidders are allocated with priority based on the expected
surplus each generates.
More precisely, we have ￿c
1 = v1(rc) and ￿c
2 = v2(rc) where rc 2 ]0;1[








Proof: See appendix 3.
Setting high reserve prices (such that r1 < r2) for any t ￿ t prevents
participation of bidders associated with a positive marginal revenue and is
therefore sub-optimal. Indeed, when t ￿ t and r1 < r2, we either have
MR1(r1;t) > 0 or MR2(r2;t) > 0 or both3. Thus to maximize revenue
sellers cover the entire market.
It is then obvious that any reservation prices such that r1 > r2 cannot be
optimal. Sellers are better-o⁄ raising both reserve prices to vi(￿R) (i = 1;2)
as they extract more surplus without a⁄ecting participation. Thus, we must
have r1 = r2 = r to maximize joint pro￿ts, and
￿1 + ￿2 =
Z r
0







Di⁄erentiating the above expression with respect to r leads to (9). No-
tice that at the solution, MRi(rc;t) > 0. Thus the cooperative reserve prices
are greater than the monopolistic ones. Bidders would be better-o⁄ under
sequential, monopolistic auctioning.
Lemma 2: A necessary and su¢ cient condition for bidders to be allocated
e¢ ciently is that type ￿ = 1
2, who values the items equally, must be
3The remaining possibility: MRi(ri;t) < 0 for i = 1;2 requires r1 > r2.
11equally likely to win either object. Technically, it requires ￿M = 1=2,
where ￿M refers to the median type (F (￿M) = 1=2). If the distribution
of tastes is skewed, participation is distorted towards the least preferred
item.
Proof: See Appendix 4.




it is more likely to have a greater number of bidders preferring item 1. In
that case, b ￿ <
1
2
and cooperating sellers set the marginal bidder, type rc,
such that ￿M < rc < b ￿ so that MR1(rc;t) > MR2(rc;t). Basically, sellers set
a higher reserve price for the preferred item which reduces the informational
rents left on its market. The lower reserve price, set for the least preferred
object, has the advantage of promoting participation.
5 Competing sellers.
I proceed as follows. First I describe the analytical solution, then explain the
underlying intuition and ￿nally describe its properties.
Assume there exists an equilibrium such that r1 ￿ r2. The ￿rst order
conditions from maximizing the expected pro￿ts lead to4:
n(1 ￿ F(￿R))
n￿1 [v1(￿R) ￿ ￿1] = g1 (￿R;t);
and
n(F(￿R))
n￿1 [v2(￿R) ￿ ￿2] = g2(￿R;t):
where g1(￿;t) and g2(￿;t) are given by:







g2 (￿;t) = MR2 (￿;t)[F (￿)]
n￿1 ￿ t




4See Appendix for details.
12Since (1) must hold in equilibrium, the optimal reserve prices must guar-
antee that
g1 (￿R;t) = g2 (￿R;t): (12)
Moreover, in any equilibrium where reserve prices are set such that r1 > r2,
the indi⁄erent type be granted a non-negative expected utility to participate.
Thus, in equilibrium we must also have:
gi (￿R;t) ￿ 0 for i = 1;2: (13)
Depending on whether both (12) and (13) hold, two di⁄erent types of equi-
libria arise. For each the market is entirely covered. Let ￿￿
i denote seller i￿ s
reserve price in equilibrium (i = 1;2).
Proposition 4: Equilibrium reserve prices for close substitutes.




such that for any given degree of product
di⁄erentiation t < t there exists a unique equilibrium. It is such that
the market is entirely covered (i.e. r￿
1 > r￿
2) and each seller leaves some
participation rents to the indi⁄erent (weakest) type (￿￿
i < vi(￿R￿) for
i = 1;2). Bidders are allocated with priority based on the expected total
surplus each type generates. This allocation of bidders is e¢ cient if









1 = v1(￿R￿) ￿
g1(￿R￿;t)
n[1 ￿ F (￿R￿)]
n￿1
￿￿

































13Proof: See Appendix 5.




di⁄erent type of equilibria arise.




there exists multiple equilibria. In any of
these equilibria the indi⁄erent bidder gets no rents.




there exists a non-empty range of types ￿t
de￿ned as follows:
￿t = f￿ 2 [0;1] : MRi(￿;t) ￿ 0 and gi (￿;t) ￿ 0 for i = 1;2g:
Any ￿￿
1 = v1(r￿) and ￿￿
2 = v2(r￿) with r￿ 2 ￿t forms a Nash equilib-
rium. (Proof: See Appendix 6.)
Lemma 4 completes the characterization of the optimal reserve prices for
the cases t = t and t = t.
Lemma 4: At t = t the unique solution is such that ￿￿
1 = v1(r￿) and
￿￿
2 = v2(r￿) with r￿ = b ￿. At t = t; the unique solution is such that ￿￿
1 = v1(￿t)
and ￿￿
2 = v2(￿t) with ￿t de￿ned as:
g1 (￿t;t) = g2 (￿t;t):
(The proof follows from proofs of proposition 4 and 5.)
Intuitively, we can explain the above results as follows. Assume seller 2
sets his reserve price r2 equal to r￿
2 which belongs to the set of equilibria,
and let us focus at seller 1. Since MR1(r￿





wants to allow entry of all ￿ 2 [0;r￿
2]. Whether he wants to overlap on his
opponent￿ s market and set r￿
1 > r￿
2 depends on t.
In the presence of a competitor, the marginal bene￿t from lowering the re-
serve price is weakened as a seller￿ s market share extends only up to ￿R. Yet
the marginal cost is the same. Thus competing sellers are overall less inclined
to lower their reserve prices.
For relatively low values of t, the intrinsic valuations and the marginal rev-
enue associated with each bidder are both high. Moreover, the relative valu-
ation of bidders in absolute value, that is jv1 ￿ v2j, increases with t. Extrap-
olating a little: it is ￿cheaper￿for seller 1 to deter a bidder from attending
the auction for item 2 when the two items are almost identical (t low). It is
14therefore bene￿cial for seller 1 to set low reserve prices (r￿
1 > r￿
2) for close sub-
stitutes. By opposition, as products become more di⁄erentiated, the intrinsic
value of an additional bidder lowers while the relative value of their outside
option increases. In such cases, seller 1 does not bene￿t from infringing on







a seller￿ s revenue is not di⁄erentiable at the solution as it
forms a peak. Figure 2 describes the equilibrium:
Insert ￿gure 2 here.
In equilibrium the following properties hold.









. Thus the equilibrium
reserve prices under competition leads to more restricted entry than
the monopolistic ones. Clearly, participation is more costly when there
is an outside option. This constrains each seller￿ s strategic choices.
Participation rents: Competition for close substitutes lead sellers to aban-
don rents to their weakest bidder since ￿￿
i < vi (￿R￿) for i = 1;2. To

















Indeed to lure away a bidder from his opponent￿ s auction each seller
must take into account the value of the marginal bidder not to him but
to to his opponent. More precisely, to dissuade the marginal bidder
from attending his opponent, seller 1 takes into account the fact that






to seller 2. Similarly, seller 2￿ s







Leaving participation rents is clearly a Pareto dominated strategy as
15both sellers would be better-o⁄setting their reserve prices equal to the
valuations of the indi⁄erent type.
E¢ ciency: E¢ ciency for t < t relies once again on the same necessary and
su¢ cient condition. In the proof of proposition 4 we show that if it
is more likely that consumers prefer item 1 on average (￿M < 1
2) then
the indi⁄erent consumer will be closer to item 1. Despite participation
rents, this suggests that once again, the seller with the ￿preferred￿
item is able to sustain higher reservation prices than his opponent. For
higher values of t, we have the following result:
Lemma 2: When ￿M = 1
2, the cooperative, e¢ cient reserve prices rc = 1
2





Proof: When ￿M = 1























< 0 for i = 1;2.
The link between Auction and Oligopoly Pricing
Bulow and Roberts [1] teach us that computing the optimal reserve
price for an auction with symmetric bidders is equivalent to computing the
monopoly price when considering the demand associated with a representa-
tive bidder (as shown above). As we have seen, for substantially di⁄erenti-
ated items (t ￿ t) this remains true. A natural question is then whether this
analogy holds for closer substitutes.
Applying the Bulow and Roberts￿[1] approach consists in constructing
each seller￿ s residual demand considering that a bidder￿ s opportunity cost of
not attending one seller￿ s auction is not only his valuation but this minus
what he expects at the other auction. For instance a representative buyer
will purchase item 1 when prices are given by pi = vi (ri) (i = 1;2) if and
only if the forllowing two conditions hold:
v1 (￿) ￿ p1 ￿ 0 and v1 (￿) ￿ p1 ￿ v2 (￿) ￿ p2:























if r1 > r2:
Condering a uniform distribution of types, we can evaluate the equili-
birum prices and reserve prices. We get the following result:
The optimal (symmetric) reserve prices are given by
￿













































Thus, the two solutions do not coincide. From Burguet and SÆkovics [3]
we learn that the analogy established in Bulow and Roberts [1] is present
exclusively when a marginal change in the reserve price a⁄ects the revenue
only when a single bidder attended the auction. Consider the case of a
monopolistic seller. If, prior to the change, the seller attracted more than a
single bidder, then it is quite obvious that a marginal change in his reserve
price will not a⁄ect his revenue. When competing sellers are considered,
a marginal change in the reserve price may a⁄ect a seller￿ s revenue even
conditional on him attracting more than a single seller initially. In Burguet
and SÆkovics [3] this is the case as reserve prices not only determine the
price paid by a single bidder but also the composition of demand. In the
case analyzed here, a marginal change in the reserve price a⁄ects a seller￿ s
revenue conditional on gathering one but also two, and exactly two, bidders.
Indeed, the ￿rst order condition taken at all r1 ￿ r2 from maximizing seller
1￿ s revenue can be written as:
@￿1
@r1
























17The ￿rst term expresses the marginal change in revenue when a single bidder
was present at the auction. The probability of attracting one and only one





(1 ￿ F (￿R))
n￿2 (F (￿R))
2 is the probability that exactly
2 bidders attended the auction. In any equilibrium where r1 > r2 seller 1￿ s
market share is given by [0;￿R] where ￿R < r1. All of the bidders he gathers
have valuations strictly greater than the reserve price. When 2 bidders attend
the same auction the minimum bid (and thus price) is at least equal to
v1 (￿R) > ￿1. Thus, conditional on attracting 2 bidders, the seller saves
2(v1(￿R) ￿ ￿1) which is subject to marginal changes in the reserve price.
Conditional on attracting 3 bidders, marginal changes in the reserve price no
longer a⁄ects the seller￿ s revenue. The lowest possible bid (potentially equal
to v1(￿R)) is never the price.
6 Conclusion
This paper deals with strategic market allocation achieved by two sellers
using auctions instead of prices. More precisely sellers strategically set their
reserve prices which in turn determine the bidders￿attendance. We give a
necessary and su¢ cient condition to reach an e¢ cient allocation of bidders,
where by e¢ cient we mean that buyers bid for the item they most value.
The results can be summarized as follows.
E¢ ciency is reached if and only if the distribution of bidders is not skewed,
whether sellers compete or cooperate. If an object is preferred on average,
sellers are able to take advantage of this by setting a higher reserve price
for this item. This allows to reduce informational rents for this item while
it promotes participation for the least preferred item￿ s auction. In general,
market shares are determined with priority based on the expected surplus a
bidder generates.
The cooperative solution is such that reserve prices are equal to the in-
di⁄erent bidder￿ s valuations so that he gets no rents. Market splits so that
the expected value of the marginal bidder is the same to either seller.
The competitive solution departs from the cooperative one in di⁄erent
ways according to the degree of product di⁄erentiation. As sellers hold close
substitutes the weakest, indi⁄erent bidder gathers participation rents. As
product di⁄erentiation increases, sellers save on these rents as they refrain
18from infringing their opponent￿ s market share. In such cases there exists
several equilibria for which sellers are constrained by the choice of their op-
ponent￿ s reserve price. We show that the cooperative equilibrium is one of
the potential outcomes.
Several interesting extensions could be considered. First, a natural ques-
tion is what mechanism would sellers use in equilibrium if this was part of
their strategic choices. Such an issue is complex not only because of the level
of interdependence auction performances exhibit mentioned in the introduc-
tion. The consideration of horizontally di⁄erentiated substitutes potentially
triggers countervailing incentives. Indeed, as a buyer lies about his type it
a⁄ects the expected utility from attending a speci￿c auction as well as his
reservation utility. If sellers cooperate, it can be in their interest to resort to
ine¢ cient allocations (see, for instance, Parlane [7]) to play with these coun-
tervailing incentives so as to save on informational rents. If sellers compete
it is not clear whether the best reply to an e¢ cient mechanism, such as the
English auction, is also an e¢ cient mechanism.
A second interesting extension would be to analyze sequential versus simul-
taneous auctioning. The analysis performed in this paper shows that entry
is more severely restricted under simultaneous auctions. The obvious is that
competition for each item is then weaker. Yet, higher reserve prices also
mean less informational rents.
197 Appendix
￿ Appendix 1: Proof of proposition 1.
If reserve prices are such that r1 ￿ r2, the proof is trivial since the
reservation utility is zero.
Let the reserve prices be such that r1 > r2.
Claim 1:For any R 2 ]0;+1)￿(￿1;1[ with r1 > r2, ￿R, de￿ned by (1),
is unique and always within the interval [0;1].
Proof: Consider the function
H (￿) = (1 ￿ F(￿))
n￿1 (r1 ￿ ￿) ￿ F
n￿1(￿)(￿ ￿ r2);
de￿ned over [0;1]. Given (1),we have:
H(￿R) ￿ 0:
Given any R such that r1 > r2, we have5 H(0) > 0 and H(1) < 0. Since H(:)
is continuous, there exists at least one value ￿R 2 [0;1] such that H(￿R) = 0.
For any ￿ ￿ minfr1;1g, H (￿) < 0. For any ￿ ￿ maxf0;r2g, H(￿) > 0. Thus,







Thus, there exists at most one ￿R 2 [0;1] such that H(￿R) ￿ 0.
Claim 2: The buyers￿strategy depicted in proposition 1 forms a Nash
equilibrium.
Proof: Assume that (n￿1) buyers adopt the strategy depicted in propo-
sition 1. Consider a buyer of type ￿. Let Ui(￿) with i = 1;2 denote this
bidder￿ s expected payo⁄ when attending seller i (i = 1;2). (We focus at the
case where 0 < r2 < r1 < 1. The extension to r1 > 1 and/or r2 < 0 is
trivial.)
-If ￿ 2 [r1;1] then U2 (￿) > 0 > U1 (￿) : attending seller 2 is a best reply.
-If ￿ 2 [0;r2] then U1 (￿) > 0 > U2 (￿) : attending seller 1 is a best reply.





(1 ￿ F (￿R))
n￿1 t(r1 ￿ ￿)
+
R ￿R
￿ t(x ￿ ￿)(n ￿ 1)(1 ￿ F(x))
n￿2 f(x)dx if ￿ < ￿R
(1 ￿ F (￿R))
n￿1 t(r1 ￿ ￿) if ￿ ￿ ￿R;







n￿1 t(￿ ￿ r2) if ￿ ￿ ￿R
(F (￿R))
n￿1 t(￿ ￿ r2)
+
R ￿R
￿ t(￿ ￿ x)(n ￿ 1)(F(x))
n￿2 f(x)dx if ￿ > ￿R:






> 0. Moreover we have
U1 (￿R) = U2 (￿R) by de￿nition of ￿R, and Ui (￿R) > 0 for i = 1;2. Thus for
any ￿ < ￿R (respectively ￿ > ￿R) attending seller 1 (respectively seller 2)
forms a best reply. Therefore the strategy depicted in proposition 1 forms a
Nash equilibrium.
￿ Appendix 2: Proof of proposition 2.
To clarify the presentation I will write the sellers￿pro￿ts as a function of
(r1;r2) instead of (￿1;￿2) and consider r as a strategic variable instead of ￿.
There is no loss in generalities in doing so.
Let ￿i(ri;rj) denote seller i￿ s expected pro￿t function (i = 1;2 and j 6= i).
Let MRi(:;t) (i = 1;2) and gi(:;t) (i = 1;2) be the functions de￿ned by (4),
(7), (10) and (11) in the text.














g1(￿R;t) ￿ nt(1 ￿ F(￿R))
n￿1 (r1 ￿ ￿R)
￿
















n￿1 (￿R ￿ r2) ￿ g2(￿R;t)
￿
for r2 < r1:
(16)
Assume t > t. As ￿gure 1 shows, there always exist ￿1 and ￿2 such that
MRi(￿i;t) = 0 for i = 1;2 and such that ￿1 < ￿2.
Assume seller 2 sets ￿2 = v2 (￿2). Over the interval [0;￿2] ￿1 (r1;￿2) reaches
a maximum at ￿1 since
@￿1
@r1
= 0 at ￿1 and concavity is ensured under the








> 0 and g1(￿(r1;￿2);t) <
MR1(￿(r1;￿2);t) < 0.
Assume seller 1 sets ￿1 = v1 (￿1). Over the interval [￿1;1] ￿2 (r2;￿1) reaches
a maximum at ￿2 since
@￿2
@r2
= 0 at ￿2 and concavity is ensured under the








> 0 and g2(￿(￿1;r2);t) <
MR2(￿(￿1;r2);t) < 0. Thus, independently on whether they compete or max-
imize joints pro￿ts, seller i￿ s optimal reserve price when t > t is given by
￿i = vi (￿i) for i = 1;2.
￿ Appendix 3: Proof of proposition 3.
Let t ￿ t and assume sellers maximize joint pro￿ts.
In the text we prove formally that, joint pro￿t maximization requires











h(r) = (1 ￿ F(r))
n￿1 MR1(r;t) ￿ (F(r))
n￿1 MR2(r;t): (17)
Let ￿i be such that MRi(￿i;t) ￿ 0 for i = 1;2. For any t ￿ t we have ￿1 ￿ ￿2.
The function h(r) is strictly decreasing over [￿2;￿1]. We have h(￿2) > 0 and
h(￿1) < 0. Thus, over the range [￿2;￿1] there is one and only one value rc
such that h(rc) = 0. For any r < ￿2, we have h(r) > 0, and for any r > ￿1
we have h(r) < 0. Thus, rc is a unique solution to
d(￿1 + ￿2)
dr










Thus the sellers￿joint pro￿ts reach a maximum at r = rc.







22(() Assume ￿M =
1
2
, then we have b ￿ =
1
2








then the allocation of bidders cannot be e¢ cient. In other words we









































we necessarily have h(
1
2
) < 0, which proves that rc =
1
2
is not a solution.














￿ Appendix 5: Proofs of proposition 4.
The ￿rst step consists in proving that there exists a range of degree of
product di⁄erentiation below which both, (12) and (13) can hold.




such that for any t 2 ]0;t[ there
exists a unique ￿t 2 [￿2;￿1] for which g1 (￿t;t) = g2 (￿t;t). The variable
t solves
g1 (￿t;t) = g2 (￿t;t) = 0:
Proof:
(1) Existence and uniqueness of ￿t.
Under the regularity assumption, the function (g1 (￿;t) ￿ g2 (￿;t)) is con-
tinuous over [0;1] and decreasing in ￿ over [￿2;￿1]. Let tl be de￿ned as the
highest value for t such that for any t 2 (0;tl], g1 (￿2;t) ￿ g2(￿2;t) > 0 and
g1(￿1;t)￿g2 (￿1;t) < 0 (it is obvious that tl > 0). For any t 2 (0;tl], we neces-
sarily have g1 (￿;t)￿g2(￿;t) > 0 for any ￿ 2 [0;￿2] while g1(￿;t)￿g2 (￿;t) < 0
for any ￿ 2 [￿1;1]. Thus, for any such t, there exists at most one ￿t such
that:
g1(￿t;t) ￿ g2(￿t;t) = 0: (18)
(2) Existence and uniqueness of t.
23Let t denote the degree of product di⁄erentiation such that:
g1 (￿t;t) = g2 (￿t;t) = 0:
Given that gi (￿t;t) = 0 (for i = 1;2) we necessarily have MRi (￿t;t) > 0,
for i = 1;2, which means that ￿t 2 [￿2;￿1]. This implies that t 2 (0;tl] for
which existence and uniqueness of ￿t has been established. The variable t is
then solution to
t = MR1 (￿t;t)
￿
1 ￿ F (￿t)
F (￿t)
￿n￿1
f (￿t), where ￿t 2 [￿2;￿1]:
It is obvious that t > 0.
We necessarily have t < t since at t = t, we have ￿1 = ￿2 = b ￿, and





















= 0 for i = 1;2 with e ￿1 < e ￿2. Thus, wherever, they meet, the
functions g1(:) and g2(:) are necessarily strictly negative.
Uniqueness of t. Consider any t 2 (0;tl]. For such t let G(t) ￿ gi (￿t;t)
where i = 1 or 2. The function G(t) is continuous. As t ! 0, G(t) > 0 since
gi (￿;0) > 0 for any ￿ 2 ]0;1[. To prove uniqueness of t we prove that G(t) is











￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿=￿t
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> 0. We always have
@gi
@t
< 0 for i = 1;2. Thus, whether one sets i = 1 or i = 2 in the expression




We may now prove that the reservation prices described in proposition 4
form an equilibrium. Let t ￿ t. Consider (￿￿
1;￿￿
2) presented in proposition 4.
They satisfy the ￿rst order conditions. Moreover, since these reserve prices
are set such that ￿R￿ = ￿t for any t < t, the additional restrictions (12) and
(13) hold. Thus, all we must prove is that they also satisfy the second order
conditions. In order to do so, we need more information on the functions
gi(￿;t) (i = 1;2).




= 0 for any t.
Proof: We have g1 (0;t) = 1, and g1 (1;t) = ￿
t
f(1)
< 0. Since g1 is










> 0, we always have
d
d￿
g1 (￿;t) < 0 at e ￿1. Thus, e ￿1 is
unique.




= 0 for any t.
Proof: We have g2 (1;t) = 1, and g2 (0;t) = ￿
t
f(0)
< 0. Since g2 is a
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> 0, we always have
d
d￿
g2 (￿;t) > 0 at
e ￿2. Thus, e ￿2 is unique.
Given the previous points we know that the curves of marginal revenues
and gi(:) interact as follows for t < t:
Insert ￿gure 3 here.
We can now prove that the proposed solution maximizes each seller￿ s
expected pro￿t. For any of these reserve prices we have r￿
2 < ￿t < r￿
1.
Consider seller 1. He takes as given r￿
2, such that r￿




> 0 for all r1 < r￿
2 since MR1 (r;t) > 0 for all r ￿ ￿t. For any
r1 2 [r￿






(1 ￿ F (￿R))
n￿1 H1(￿R;r1;t) = 0;
at r1 = r￿

































which proves that r￿
1 is best reply to r￿
2.
Consider now seller 2. He takes as given r￿
1, such that r￿




< 0 for all r2 > r￿
1 since MR2 (r;t) > 0 for all r ￿ ￿t. For any
r2 2 (￿1;r￿







n￿1 H2(￿R;r2;t) = 0 at r2 = r
￿
































which proves that r￿
2 is best reply to r￿
1. (Expression (14) can be found easily
using (12).)











is symmetric. We have b ￿ =
1
2
and setting ￿R￿ =
1
2
, satis￿es the ￿rst order
conditions as well as (14).
(() We use a similar approach as the one presented in Appendix 3, for






, but this time we
use contradiction in the proof. Assume that ￿M 6=
1
2








solve (14). Consider in details the case where ￿M <
1
2











































Assume now that ￿R￿ =
1
2
forms a solution. Under this assumption and by


















































. Indeed, all that was done was to add and subtract v1 (￿R￿) in the
bracket on the left hand side, and add and subtract v2 (￿R￿) in the brackets




















. Thus, ￿R￿ =
1
2
cannot form a solution as all terms on the right
hand side of (14) are less than those of the right hand side.
A symmetric argumentation can be used to prove that a contradiction
arises when ￿M >
1
2














. For such t, the marginal revenue and gi(:;:) curves interact
as follows:
Insert ￿gure 4 here.
(1) The set ￿t is always non-empty. Let
￿i = f￿ : MRi (￿;t) ￿ 0 and gi (￿;t) ￿ 0g
for i = 1;2. Since g1 (￿;t) is decreasing over [0;￿1] with g1(￿1;t) < 0, ￿1 is








= 0. Since g2 (￿;t) is increasing










By de￿nition we have ￿t = ￿1 \ ￿2. As t < t we have ￿2 < ￿1. Thus,
￿t would be empty if and only if e ￿2 < e ￿1. However, for t > t, we have
gi (￿t;t) < 0 for i = 1;2 and therefore e ￿2 > e ￿1.
28Consider now any r￿





MR1 (r;t) > 0 for all r < r￿








2);t) < 0 which implies that
@￿1
@r1
< 0 for all r1 ￿ r￿
2. At r￿
2; ￿1 is not














as " ! 0. Yet, it
also forms a maximum (as it appears on picture 2 in the text)..
Consider now any r￿





MR2 (r;t) > 0 for all r > r￿








1;r2);t) < 0 which implies that
@￿2
@r2
> 0 for all r2 < r￿
1. Once again at
r2 = r￿
1 the pro￿t function forms a peak.
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